THE FIRST PHASE: THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS
The first disruption of credit markets in the recent financial crisis is often dated to August 7, 2007, when the French bank BNP Paribas suspended redemption of shares held in some of its money market funds. A boom in U.S. housing prices had peaked around 2005. As housing prices started to decline, mortgage-backed financial securities-in many cases, securities based on subprime residential mortgages but then divided into more senior claims that were supposedly safe and junior claims that were recognized to be risky-began to experience huge losses. By early 2008, losses on these securities were estimated to be on the order of $500 billion dollars (for example, Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) .
What developed in late 2007 and into 2008 was a series of runs on financial institutions, but instead of the classic bank run, it was, as described by Gorton and Metrick (2009) , a run on the shadow banking system. A bank has deposits that are short-term liabilities and assets that are long-term loans. Thus, in a classic bank run, when bank depositors run to withdraw deposits, the bank cannot readily convert its long-term assets into cash. In the shadow banking system, institutions has short-term liabilities in the form of short-term borrowing, like repurchase agreements (or repos), which use longer-term assets like mortgage-backed securities as collateral. A key element of this borrowing is the use of a "haircut," that is, a requirement that borrowers post collateral that is valued at more than the loan. For example, if a borrower took out a $100 million loan in a repo agreement, it might have to post $105 million of mortgagebacked securities as collateral, and the haircut would then be 5 percent. As the value of mortgage-backed securities fell and uncertainty about their future value increased, haircuts to levels as high as 50 percent. The result was that the same amount of collateral would now support less borrowing, leading to deleveraging in which financial institutions had to sell off assets. The resulting "fire sale" dynamic (discussed by Shleifer and Vishny in this issue) led to an adverse feedback loop in which the decline in asset values lowered the collateral's value while further raising uncertainty, causing haircuts to rise further, which forced financial institutions to deleverage and sell more assets, and so on.
One signal of the resulting credit market disruptions appears in the interest rate spreads between safe and risky financial instruments.. For example, the "TED spread" is the spread between the interest rate on interbank lending (as measured by the LIBOR interest rate on threemonth eurodollar deposits) and the interest rate on three-month U.S. Treasury bills. The TED spread provides an assessment of counterparty risk from one bank lending to another, reflecting both liquidity and credit risk concerns. The collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 was the most visible of these runs on the shadow financing system. Short-term financing for Bear Stearns dried up. Its long-term assets could not quickly be turned into ready cash at a fair price, and without access to short-term funding, it could not continue. The Federal Reserve brokered a deal a deal for J.P. Morgan/Chase to purchase Bear, which was not unprecedented, but as part of the deal the Fed also took onto its books $30 billion of Bear Stearn's toxic assets, which was unprecedented. However, this deal and the opening of new Federal Reserve lending facilities to investment banks helped restore some calm to the market. The TED spread surged to over 200 basis points in March 2008, but then fell back below 100 basis points.
By summer 2008, credit markets were clearly impaired and credit risk was rising, as can be seen by the rise in the spread between interest rates on Baa corporate bonds and Treasury bonds in Figure 1 . However, the financial crisis looked like it could be contained. The BaaTreasury spread had climbed to over 200 basis points, but these levels were similar to those that occurred in the aftermath of the mild recession in 2001. The TED spread, although elevated, was also below its peak values immediately after the revelations of problems at BNP Paribas and the Bear Stearns collapse. Many forecasters in the public and private hoped that the worst was over.
After all, they reasoned that the subprime mortgage sector was only a small part of overall capital markets, and the losses in the related mortgage-backed securities, although substantial, seemed manageable. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office (2008) 
THE SECOND PHASE: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
In the space of a few short weeks in the fall 2008, everything changed. On Monday, September 15, 2008, after suffering losses in the subprime market, Lehman Brothers, the fourthlargest investment bank by asset size with over $600 billion in assets and 25,000 employees, filed for bankruptcy-the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history. Conventional discussions of the evolution of the financial crisis often view the Lehman bankruptcy as the key event that morphed the subprime crisis into a virulent global financial crisis. Although the Lehman bankruptcy led a large increase in uncertainty and a wave of distressed selling of securities that caused a collapse in asset prices and a drying up of liquidity, I will argue that the collapse of Lehman was followed by three events that were at least as important in causing the subprime crisis to go global: the AIG collapse on September 16, 2008; the run on the Reserve Primary Fund on the same day; and the struggle to get the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) plan approved by Congress over the following couple of weeks.
In considering these events, it's also important to remember that the financial system had been greatly weakened before September 2008 in ways that had not yet been fully recognized at that time. Just as a relatively small sound or vibration can trigger an avalanche, if the snow conditions have made the danger of such an avalanche high, it may be that with given the amount of systemic risk embedded in the financial system, some other stress or failure of a financial institution would also have revealed the fragility of the financial system-and then led to a chain reaction that could also have tipped the financial system over the cliff.
The Lehman Bankruptcy
Many commentators have argued that the Treasury and the Fed's decision to allow Lehmann to go bankrupt was a colossal mistake that turned a mild financial disruption into a global financial crisis. With hindsight, it is hard to argue that allowing Lehman to go bankrupt was the right decision. But it's useful to remember that at the time, there was a plausible case for letting Lehman go into bankruptcy.
First, in practical terms, the U.S. government or its regulatory authorities had no authority to put Lehman into a government conservatorship so it could keep functioning, as the Treasury was able to do with Fannie and Freddie Mac. Thus, the only possible solution was to broker a purchase of Lehman. Barclays was in discussions about buying Lehman, but British bank regulators were skeptical and the Fed refused to take more bad assets on to its balance sheet, as it had done with Bear Stearns. Barclays ended up buying parts of Lehman a week after it declared bankruptcy.
Second, the bailout of Bear Stearns had extended the government safety net outside the banking system to investment banks, and the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve were concerned about increasing moral hazard incentives on the part of a wider set of financial institutions to take on excessive risk. Indeed, as we now know, Lehman was going to extraordinary efforts, including engaging in shady accounting practices, to hide its leverage, even after the financial crisis started in August 2007.
3 Letting Lehman fail would serve as a warning to other financial firms that they needed to reign in their risk taking.
Third, it was an open secret in the financial markets and among government officials that if any of the major investment banks would run into trouble, Lehman would be at the top of the list. Lehman was among the most leveraged of the major investment banks; it was unwilling to raise capital; it had a poor reputation for risk management; and it had a high exposure to losses on subprime mortgages because it had large holdings of securities tied to valuations of these The enormous risk taking at AIG and its potential to blow up the financial system had been largely unrecognized by government officials, regulators, and markets. Once Bear Stearns had to be bailed out, it became apparent that a wider group of financial institutions could pose major systemic risks to the financial system. But in discussions at that time among regulators and academics about the need to regulate a wider group of financial institutions (in which I participated), AIG was not mentioned in the category of firms that would require special supervisory attention. This, along with Chairman Bernanke's later statement in Congressional testimony about how angry he was that AIG took on such risk, describing AIG as effectively running a huge hedge fund inside an insurance company (Torres and Son, 2009) , indicates how much the AIG blow up was a surprise.
Reserve Primary Fund
The same Primary Fund revealed that the financial system was engaged in what could be described as one huge "carry trade". Technically carry trades are ones in which a trader borrows at a low interest rate to fund the purchase of assets that yield a high interest rate. Carry trades generate immediate profits, but may be very risky because the higher interest rate on the purchased assets may just reflect greater tail risk for that asset. AIG's issuing of credit default swaps is a classic example of a type of carry trade, because the firm was earning large profits on the premiums paid on these contracts until the tail risk became a realization. In a prescient and now-famous paper, Rajan (2005) warned that this carry-trade problem was a danger to the financial system because incentives in compensation schemes for financial firms were leading to financial market participants engaging in financial transactions that produced immediate income, but exposed the financial system to massive risks.
Second, although markets had been watching government agencies scramble to deal with the financial crisis since late 2007, the events of September 2008 raised serious doubts that the U.S. government had the capability to manage the crisis. After all, the Fed and the U.S. Treasury proved unable to craft a solution so that Lehman would not fail. The AIG bailout was huge and unexpected. TARP was originally proposed as a flimsy, three-page proposal, which raised concerns that the Treasury was unprepared, and the initial TARP proposal failed on a bipartisan vote. Even though the TARP legislation was eventually passed, the reputational damage was done.
After September 2008, the pattern of runs on the shadow banking system intensified and worsened. Banks began to horde cash and were unwilling to lend to each other, despite huge injections of liquidity into the financial system by the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, The subprime crisis had become a full-fledged, global financial crisis.
The patterns of credit spreads tell the story. As shown in Figure 1 , the TED spread rose from around 100 basis points during the week before the Lehman bankruptcy to over 300 basis points on September 17, the day after the liquidity squeeze on AIG and the Reserve Primary Second, the decline in asset prices during a financial crisis causes a decline in the value of collateral, which makes it harder for nonfinancial firms to borrow. In addition, the deterioration of balance sheets at financial firms, which have the expertise to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems, causes their lending to fall, a process which is described by the term "deleveraging", which causes spending to decline. Panel 
Policy Responses To The Financial Crisis
The most powerful U.S. policy responses to the financial crisis came through policies that applied to the financial and banking system: conventional and unconventional monetary policies, bank "stress tests," and bailouts of some banks and financial institutions. Many of these policies were implemented by the Federal Reserve, but others involved cooperation with fiscal authorities.
Nonconventional Monetary Policy
In 2002 points above the federal funds rate target. In addition, the Fed expanded the types of securities that would be eligible to be used as collateral. But discount lending has two problems: 1) it's typically viewed as a bad signal for banks to borrow through the discount mechanism, because it suggests they had nowhere else to turn; and 2) discount lending has traditionally only gone to banks, not to other financial institutions.
To solve the problem of negative signals, the Fed set up a temporary Term Auction Facility (TAF) which enabled banks to borrow anonymously at a rate determined through a competitive auction. The TAF auctions started at amounts of $20 billion, but as the crisis worsened, the total loans outstanding though this mechanism rose to exceed $400 billion. 6 The lending to J.P. Morgan to prop up Bear Stearns was in effect a purchase of asssets. In order for the Federal Reserve to abide by its legal authority, it could not purchase private assets outright. Instead, it made a nonrecourse loan: that is, the Fed had no recourse to require J.P. Morgan to pay back the loan, but instead would take ownership of the collateral, the $30 billion of toxic assets. Hence the Fed would bear any losses or gains on these assets so in economic terms it had purchased these assets.
The second category of nonconventional approaches to monetary policy, asset purchases, is based on the belief that a direct purchase can stimulate spending by raising prices on particular classes of bonds, thereby lowering the interest rates that households and businesses have to pay.
This policy began with the purchase of $300 billion of long-term Treasury bonds, which started in March 2009 and ended in October 2009. Empirical evidence on a previous Fed attempt to lower long-term interest rates relative to short-term rates in the 1960s-which was dubbed "Operation Twist" because its intent was to "twist" and flatten the yield curve-deemed that it didn't work (Modigliani and Sutch, 1967) . However, as Solow and Tobin (1987) for the proposition that a commitment to keep short-term interest rates low for a substantial period of time helps lower long-term interest rates and also raises inflation expectations, thereby reducing the real interest rate (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, 2004; Woodford, 2003) . But at least so far, no empirical evidence is available for how effective management of expectations was during this episode.
The Bank Stress Tests
Financial markets began to recover in the first half of 2009. The provision of huge amounts of liquidity appeared to do the trick in the interbank lending market, with the TED spread falling from its peak of over 400 basis points in October to below 100 basis points in January 2009. This spread fell to below pre-crisis levels (less than 20 basis points) by May 2009. Credit spreads also began to fall with the Baa-Treasury spread declining from its peak in
October, but at a slower pace than the improvement in the interbank market, as illustrated in The Treasury announced the results in early May 2009 and they were well received by market participants, allowing these banks to raise substantial amounts of capital from private capital markets that were required by the stress tests. The stress tests were a key factor that helped increase the amount of information in the marketplace, thereby reducing asymmetric information and adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Hoshi and Kashyap (forthcoming) found that similar stress tests in Japan in 2003 were a key element of the recovery of the Japanese banking system after the "lost decade" from 1992 to 2002.
Bailing Out Financial Institutions
Some of the Fed's liquidity provision was to bail out financial institution, as occurred with Bear Stearns, AIG and the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In each of these cases, the Federal Reserve provided this liquidity in cooperation with the U.S.
Treasury, which also made large loans.
Although the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) was initially intended to purchase subprime mortgage assets to help prop up financial institutions' balance sheets, it soon became clear that agreeing on a prices for those assets was unworkable. The Treasury switched to using the TARP funds to inject capital into financial institutions, thereby shoring up their balance sheets more directly. In addition, on September 29, the U.S. Treasury announced a Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds, which insured that investors would receive at least the $1 par value per share. On October 14, 2008, the FDIC announced the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) that guaranteed newly-issued senior unsecured bank debt, such as federal funds (loans of deposits at the Federal Reserve) and commercial paper, as well as noninterest bearing transaction accounts. Its stated purpose was to "strengthen confidence and encourage liquidity in the banking system" (FDIC, 2008) . Although these programs were initially intended to last less than a year, they have been extended several times.
The spreading bank failures in Europe in fall 2008 led to similar bailouts of financial institutions: for example, the U.K. Treasury set up a bailout plan that guaranteed 250 billion pounds of bank liabilities, added 100 billion pounds to a facility that swaps these assets for government bonds, and allowed the U.K. government to buy up to 50 billion pounds of equity stakes in British banks. Allessandri and Haldane (2009) discuss $10 trillion worth of these bailout packages across 20 countries, which includes both guaranteeing the debt of the banks and injecting capital into them. There was a high degree of international coordination in these policies.
Ait-Sahalia et al. (2010) find that comprehensive bailouts which helped recapitalize the financial sector did help lower interbank risk premiums, but bailouts of individual banks on an ad hoc basis were received poorly by the markets and led to a rise in interbank risk premiums. A plausible explanation is that when governments pursue ad hoc bailouts, it suggests to markets that the problem in the credit markets may be worse than they expected. In contrast, pursuing a comprehensive approach to recapitalize the financial system helps to restore confidence and to unfreeze the credit markets. Furthermore, they find that there were strong spillovers from actions taken in one country to others, suggesting the benefits of a coordinated policy response between countries to cope with a global financial crisis.
Expansionary Fiscal Policy
Fiscal stimulus to directly increase aggregate demand was another key piece of the. Second, there has is a very active debate about how much a fiscal stimulus will affect output. For example, Hall (2009) summarizes the theoretical and empirical evidence on fiscal stimulus as yielding an output multiplier between 0.7 and 1. Analysis of the stimulus using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models in Cogan et al. (2009) and Uhlig (2010) find that multipliers in the 0.6 range, while econometric evidence employed by Barro and Redlick (2009) finds an output multiplier of around 0.7. On the other hand, economists in the Obama Administration and the Congressional Budget Office, using Keynesian, large scale econometric models, estimated that the output multiplier for fiscal stimulus were well above one. Moreover, a number of models point out that when the interest rate falls to the zero lower bound after a large negative aggregate demand shock, the output multiplier from a fiscal stimulus may be much higher because expansionary fiscal policy raises inflation expectations, thereby lowering real interest rates: for example, Eggertsson (2009 ), Woodford (2010 and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) find such a result in calibrated New Keynesian models. The controversy over discretionary fiscal stimulus is explored by Auerbach and Gale in this issue.
Have Policies to Ameliorate the Financial Crisis Succeeded?
The question of whether or in which ways the policies to defuse the financial crisis have succeeded will be debated for years. One group of skeptics points out that households and firms have seen tighter credit standards and a higher cost of credit during the recession, from which they conclude that monetary policy has not been effective during the recent financial crisis (for example, Krugman, 2008) . Another view holds that many government actions were ineffective, while others may have raise the perceived level of risk in financial markets (for example, see have declined even more precipitously than we saw. The banking stress tests and systematic efforts to recapitalize the banking system also seem to have been useful. Some parts of the government intervention were less useful than others. But taken as a whole, I believe the government actions helped to prevent a far deeper recession and even possibly a depression.
AFTERMATH: CLEANING UP AFTER THE CRISIS
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 appears to be waning. There are three key areas of government policies to clean up after the crisis in order to restore the world's financial sector and the broader economy to health.
Shrinking Central Bank Balance Sheets
Actions by central banks to contain the global financial crisis resulted in huge expansions of their balance sheets. The expansion of balance sheets arising from liquidity provision is typically easy to reverse because most of the liquidity facilities have provided loans at interest rates that are higher than market rates during normal times. As financial markets return to normal, market participants are no longer willing to borrow at above-market ranks, this source of balance sheet expansion naturally reverses itself as the financial system recovers-which is exactly what has happened.
The asset market purchases of long-term mortgage-backed securities are not selfliquidating in this way. Over $1 trillion of the mortgage-backed securities have maturities of ten years or more. Thus, a strategy of just letting them run off will leave the Federal Reserve in this market for a long time, which raises several issues. First, by holding these securities the Federal
Reserve will be exposed to both credit and interest rate risk. A final concern sometimes raised is that the expansion in the monetary base will necessarily be inflationary, but this is unlikely to be the case in the current environment. The reason is that banks are perfectly happy to hold huge amounts of excess reserves-thus essentially neutralizing the effect this money would have on demand or the price level-as long as they are paid interest on the reserves, as is now the case. However, purchase of long-term government bonds has raised concerns that the Fed is willing to accommodate profligate fiscal policy by monetizing government debt, and this does have the potential to unanchor inflation expectations, which could have inflationary consequences in the future.
2 Because the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve is in effect part of the overall government balance sheet, it is not clear why potential losses on the Fed's balance sheet should matter. However, such losses would likely result in severe criticisms of the Federal Reserve and so weaken its independence.
Too-Big-To-Fail
The global financial crisis has encouraged efforts to revamp financial regulation . French et. al. (2010) offer discussions of financial regulation in the future, as do some of the other papers in this symposium. Here I will just focus on one issue, the too-big-to-fail problem.
Too-big-to-fail is a misnomer. A financial firm can be systemically important-that is, its failure can threaten the health of the financial system-either because it is so large or its activities are so interconnected with the rest of the financial system. A more accurate term would be too-interconnected-to-fail or too-systemically-important-to-fail. The failure of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1998 is a classic example of a firm that was not enormous in size, but was systemically important. In any case, the difficulty is that when creditors know that a firm falls into this category, they can expect government provide some assistance if the firm gets into trouble, which means that they have less incentive to monitor the firm and pull out their money if it is taking on too much risk. Of course, this makes excessive risk-taking more likely, and raises the cost to taxpayers of the eventual government bailout.
Too-big-to-fail is now a larger problem than before, in part because banks have merged be considered to be too-big-to-fail in the future. Indeed, the most prominent case of a firm that was not bailed out-Lehman Brothers in September 2008-was followed by such a severe crisis, that it is unlikely that governments would let this happen again. In the wake of the Lehman failure, governments throughout the world bailed out or guaranteed all their major financial institutions.
One way to address the too-big-to-fail problem is to limit the size of financial institutions, which might involve either the breakup of large financial institutions and/or limits on what activities banking institutions can engage. However, arbitrary limits on their size or activities might well decrease the efficiency or raise other risks in the financial system. An alternative view is to subject systemically important institutions to greater regulatory oversight, say by a systemic regulator (as discussed in Mishkin, 2010a; French et. al., 2010) , or by imposing larger capital requirements for systemically important financial firms.
The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill passed in summer 2010 gives the federal government one more tool for dealing with systemically important financial companies. Before Dodd-Frank, the U.S. government only could take over individual banking institutions, but not financial holding companies that own banks and other financial institutions. (In other words, it could take over Citibank, but not Citigroup or a free-standing investment bank like Lehman Brothers.) It used to be that the government had only two alternatives with such firms: send them into bankruptcy or bail them out. Now, the federal government has "resolution authority" over such firms, which means that they can treat them as they would an insolvent bank. Critics have expressed concerns that this federal resolution authority will further entrench too-big-to-fail and so make the moral hazard problem worse (for example, Wallison, 2010) . As with all regulatory authority, the devil will be in the details. But the new resolution authority is likely to help limit moral hazard because it gives the government a big stick to force systemically important financial institutions to desist from risk taking or to raise more capital-or else to face a government takeover that imposes costs on managers and shareholders.
Retrenching Fiscal Policy
The combination of massive bailouts, fiscal stimulus packages, and the sharp economic contractions that reduced tax revenue have shifted the fiscal situation for many countries. As
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out, the aftermath of financial crises is almost always a large increase in government indebtedness and we have seen exactly this pattern in the aftermath of the current crisis. Budget deficits over 10 percent of GDP in advanced countries like the United
States have been common in 2009 and 2010. This rise in government borrowing can even raise the risk of sovereign debt defaults, which can be a particular problem if sovereign debt is being held by many banks as a "safe" asset. This risk has become a serious concern in Europe after the Greek sovereign debt crisis.
As budget deficits surged after the crisis, the ratio of government debt to GDP is projected to jump to very high levels in many countries. In the next decade or so, getting fiscal houses in order will become one of the highest priorities for government policy throughout the world. In many countries, governments already faced a long-term problem of unsustainable spending growth on health care and pensions; the current fiscal imbalances have brought those problems forward in time from the long-term into the middle-term, and in some countries into the short-term and the immediate future. has happened. First, the global financial system is far more interconnected than was previously recognized and excessive risk taking that threatened the collapse of the world financial system was far more pervasive than almost anyone realized. Understanding how systemic risk can arise and designing policies to rein in this risk taking are tasks of the highest priority. Second, extraordinary actions by central banks and governments have contained this global financial crisis, but successfully unwinding these policies will prove to be a highly challenging task. Note: TED spread is the difference between the 3-month Libor rate and the constant maturity 3-month Treasury bill rate. Baa spread is the difference between constant maturity Baa rate and the 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond rate. 
CONCLUSION

